System Dynamics Modeling-Based Approach for Assessing Seismic Resilience of Hospitals: Methodology and a Case in China by Li, Z. et al.
04 August 2020
POLITECNICO DI TORINO
Repository ISTITUZIONALE
System Dynamics Modeling-Based Approach for Assessing Seismic Resilience of Hospitals: Methodology and a Case in
China / Li, Z.; Li, N.; Cimellaro, G. P.; Fang, D.. - In: JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT IN ENGINEERING. - ISSN 0742-
597X. - ELETTRONICO. - 36:5(2020), p. 04020050.
Original
System Dynamics Modeling-Based Approach for Assessing Seismic Resilience of Hospitals:
Methodology and a Case in China
Publisher:
Published
DOI:10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000814
Terms of use:
openAccess
Publisher copyright
(Article begins on next page)
This article is made available under terms and conditions as specified in the  corresponding bibliographic description in
the repository
Availability:
This version is available at: 11583/2840599 since: 2020-07-17T15:56:00Z
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
 1 
 
System Dynamics Modeling-Based Approach for Assessing Seismic Resilience of Hospitals: 1 
Methodology and a Case in China 2 
 3 
Zaishang Li, S.M.ASCE1; Nan Li, M.ASCE2; Gian Paolo Cimellaro, A.M.ASCE3;  4 
and Dongping Fang4 5 
 6 
1Ph.D. Student, Department of Construction Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China; email: 7 
lizs15@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn 8 
2Associate Professor, Department of Construction Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China; 9 
email: nanli@tsinghua.edu.cn 10 
3Associate Professor, Department of Structural, Geotechnical and Building Engineering, Politecnico di Torino, 11 
Turin 10129, Italy; email: gianpaolo.cimellaro@polito.it 12 
4Professor, Department of Construction Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China; email: 13 
fangdp@tsinghua.edu.cn (Corresponding author) 14 
 15 
Abstract 16 
Hospitals play a crucial role in providing the badly needed medical care after earthquakes. Meanwhile, hospitals 17 
are themselves likely subjects to earthquake impacts and may fail to function, which highlights that there is 18 
significant need for enhancing the resilience of hospitals to earthquakes. Nevertheless, there lacks an effective 19 
Manuscript Click here to access/download;Manuscript;Manuscript_R2.docx
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assessment approach of hospital seismic resilience, which makes it challenging for devising and benchmarking 20 
appropriate resilience enhancement measures. This study proposes a new functionality-based assessment 21 
approach of hospital resilience to earthquakes. A new indicator of hospital functionality is proposed, and a system 22 
dynamics model of hospital functionality after earthquakes (SD-HFE) is developed to simulate the hospital 23 
functionality. The resilience assessment can then be conducted based on the functionality curve, which considers 24 
both the loss and the recovery of hospital functionality. Based on a case study in China, the efficacy of the 25 
proposed approach is tested. The proposed approach advances the understanding on how hospital functionality 26 
evolves after an earthquake, and allows quantitative assessment of hospital seismic resilience. The outcomes of 27 
this study will contribute to the development of informed policies and effective engineering measures to enhance 28 
the seismic resilience of hospitals. 29 
Introduction 30 
Earthquakes are one of the most destructive natural disasters. From 1998 to 2017, earthquakes occurred 563 31 
times, which accounted for 7.8% of the numbers of all types of natural disasters but were responsible for 56% 32 
of all fatalities caused by natural disasters all around the world (Wallemacq and House 2018). Hospitals play a 33 
crucial role in the mitigation and recovery of disaster-hit regions, providing continued access to care (Arboleda 34 
et al. 2009, Cimellaro et al. 2018). Almost 97% of the injuries occur within the first thirty minutes after 35 
earthquakes (Gunn 1995), which requires a rapid and effective medical response. However, hospitals are 36 
themselves likely subjects to earthquake impacts (Li et al. 2019). For instance, the 1995 Great Hanshin 37 
earthquake resulted in 110 structurally damaged and 4 completely destroyed hospitals, out of the 180 hospitals 38 
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in the disaster-hit area (Ukai 1996). Damage to the hospitals, equipment and supplies, loss of staff will 39 
undoubtedly result in a loss of hospital functionality, which would substantially exacerbate disaster consequences 40 
(Albanese et al. 2008).  41 
During disasters like earthquakes, hospitals are required to be more than structurally safe but to maintain 42 
their functions and continue to provide medical care. The resilience of hospitals, which is focused on hospitals’ 43 
capability to resist, absorb and recover from disasters while maintaining necessary functionality, has attracted 44 
increasing attention (Zhong et al. 2014, Cimellaro et al. 2018). In 2005, “building hospitals with enough 45 
resilience level” was set as one practice to reduce the underlying risk factors in the Hyogo Framework for Action 46 
2005-2015 (UNDRR 2007). Then, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, which was 47 
endorsed following the 2015 Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (WCDRR), also 48 
highlighted the enhancement of hospital resilience to disasters as an important part of “Priorities for action” 49 
(UNDRR 2015). There have also been an increasing volume of recent studies in academia that focus on various 50 
challenges related to the disaster resilience of hospitals (Cimellaro et al. 2010b, Achour et al. 2014, Zhong et al. 51 
2015, Hassan and Mahmoud 2019), among which the assessment of hospital disaster resilience is the most urgent. 52 
Quantifying hospital resilience to disasters is essential and fundamental to benchmarking hospitals’ capability to 53 
cope with disasters and to identifying hospitals’ vulnerability in face of disasters, which is crucial for the 54 
propositions of targeted and effective resilience enhancement measures. However, the need for an effective 55 
approach for quantifying hospital resilience to earthquakes has largely remained a gap in the literature. Current 56 
“indicator-based” resilience assessment approaches, which assess hospital disaster resilience with sets of 57 
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evaluation indicators (WHO 2015), are difficult to use for parametric analysis, which is crucial for evaluating 58 
possible resilience enhancement measures. Although “functionality-based” resilience assessment approaches, 59 
which assess hospital disaster resilience based on the functionality curve (Cimellaro et al. 2010a), can overcome 60 
this limitation, efforts are still needed in the development of an indicator of hospital functionality and an 61 
approach to analyze both the loss of hospital functionality after earthquakes and its recovery over time.  62 
This study contributes to the existing body of knowledge by proposing a new functionality-based 63 
assessment approach of hospital resilience to earthquakes. Firstly, a new indicator of hospital functionality is 64 
proposed, and factors affecting the hospital functionality are identified and discussed in detail. Then, system 65 
dynamics (SD) modeling is employed to simulate the changes of hospital functionality after earthquakes, which 66 
considers both the loss and the recovery of hospital functionality. The simulation results provide the basis for 67 
seismic resilience assessment of the hospitals. Based on a case study in China, the efficacy of the proposed 68 
assessment approach is tested. The proposed approach can provide a tool to better understand how hospital 69 
functionality evolves after an earthquake and to quantitatively assess the overall seismic resilience of a hospital. 70 
The outcomes of this study are expected to contribute to the resilience management of hospitals by supporting 71 
the development of informed policies and effective engineering measures with the proposed resilience 72 
assessment approach, so that the resilience of hospitals in seismic-prone regions could be enhanced against 73 
possible seismic impacts in the future.  74 
Literature Review 75 
There are two types of assessment approaches of hospital disaster resilience that are available in the existing 76 
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literature, including “indicator-based” approaches and “functionality-based” approaches. Indicator-based 77 
approaches assess hospital disaster resilience with a series of evaluation indicators. The World Health 78 
Organization released the Hospital Safety Index Guide for Evaluators (Second Edition) in 2015, which provides 79 
a comprehensive checklist of indices for hospital safety and resilience assessment (WHO 2015). The checklist 80 
includes four modules covering hazard identification, structural safety, nonstructural safety, and emergency and 81 
disaster management. Each of the indices is evaluated qualitatively by professionals who check one of three 82 
options (low, average and high). Similarly, Zhong et al. (2015) established a conceptual framework of hospital 83 
disaster resilience and proposed a set of indicators for resilience assessment, which includes 8 domains, 17 sub-84 
domains, and 43 indicators. Assessment of hospital resilience using “indicator-based” assessment approaches 85 
can be relatively comprehensive, because of the flexibility to introduce different evaluation indicators to cover 86 
various dimensions. However, these indicators such as the aforementioned ones are usually described 87 
qualitatively, which are inherently vague and subject to evaluators’ different interpretations when they are put 88 
into practice. Meanwhile, indicator-based approaches are usually used for the resilience assessment of the current 89 
status of the hospitals (WHO 2015). It is difficult to apply these approaches to different scenarios, which 90 
prohibits the comparison of the effectiveness of different resilience enhancement measures. 91 
Functionality-based assessment approaches assess the resilience (𝑅) of a system of any type using a 92 
functionality curve (see Fig. 1). The functionality (𝑄(𝑡)) of a system varies within the range between 0 and 93 
100%. One hundred percentage means the system is fully functional, providing full service, while 0 means the 94 
system malfunctions with zero service availability. Mathematically, 𝑅 can be calculated by integrating 𝑄(𝑡) 95 
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from the occurrence of the event (𝑡0) over a control time for the period of interest (𝑡𝐿𝐶), as shown in Eq. (1) 96 
(Cimellaro et al. 2010a, Cimellaro et al. 2016). In comparison with indicator-based assessment approaches, 97 
functionality-based assessment approaches provide more details on the behavior of a system over time after 98 
being attacked by disruptions. Moreover, such formula-format definition of system resilience makes it much 99 
more feasible to be adopted in different application scenarios, especially with simulation tools (Cimellaro and 100 
Pique 2016, Khanmohammadi et al. 2018). 101 
𝑅 = ∫
𝑄(𝑡)
𝑡𝐿𝐶
𝑑𝑡
𝑡0+𝑡𝐿𝐶
𝑡0
 (1) 
[Insert Fig. 1 here] 102 
When applying functionality-based assessment approaches to assess hospital disaster resilience based on 103 
Eq. (1), it is essential to first define and calculate the hospital functionality. Yavari et al. (2010) divided a hospital 104 
into four major systems, namely structural, nonstructural, lifelines, and personnel systems, and defined the 105 
overall hospital functionality using a “functionality tree”, which covered all possible combinations of the 106 
performance levels of the four systems. Similarly, Jacques et al. (2014) used a “fault-tree” (Lee et al. 2009) 107 
structure to define and calculate hospital functionality, which was composed of three main components, 108 
including staff, structure, and stuff. However, the above two approaches do not clarify how much each system 109 
or each component affects the overall hospital functionality, which prevents the development of component-110 
specific resilience enhancement measures and assessment of optimal quantities of resources prepared for 111 
disasters. 112 
Rather than defining hospital functionality directly, some researchers proposed indicators to reflect the 113 
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overall level of hospital functionality. Different from indicator-based assessment approaches which contain sets 114 
of indicators, a single indicator is usually used for this purpose. For instance, “waiting time”, which is defined 115 
as the time between the receipt of care request by the hospital and the provision of care to the patient, is widely 116 
used to construct the indicator of hospital functionality (Cimellaro et al. 2011, Cimellaro and Pique 2016, 117 
Cimellaro et al. 2017). The hospital functionality based on waiting time can be determined based on Eq. (2) 118 
(Cimellaro and Pique 2016): 119 
𝑄(𝑡) =
𝑊𝑇(𝑛, 𝛼)
𝑚𝑎𝑥⁡(𝑊𝑇(𝑛 = 𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑡 − 1, 𝛼))
 (2) 
where 𝑄(𝑡) is hospital functionality; 𝑊𝑇 is waiting time; 𝑛 is the number of emergency rooms; 𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑡 is the 120 
total number of emergency rooms inside the emergency department; 𝛼 is an amplification factor of the patient 121 
arrival rate; 𝑡 is time. The waiting time can be calculated using discrete event simulation (DES) models, by 122 
simulating patient flows and treatment processes (Cimellaro et al. 2011, Cimellaro and Pique 2016, Cimellaro et 123 
al. 2017). The DES models shed new light on studying hospital disaster resilience, by viewing the hospital as an 124 
integrated system rather than a simple aggregation of independent components. However, the DES models in 125 
prior studies bear two major limitations. First, these models were built based on the assumption that the hospital 126 
could remain operational as usual in the aftermath of disasters. In reality, the organizational system and the 127 
operation of the hospital can change significantly during disasters, which consequently lead to changes in waiting 128 
time compared with normal conditions. Hence, such an assumption inevitably introduces bias into the resilience 129 
assessment results. Second, the recovery process of the hospital, which is one of the key determinants of 130 
resilience (Cimellaro et al. 2010a), was not considered in prior studies using the DES models.  131 
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Khanmohammadi et al. (2018) built an SD model to calculate hospital functionality, which characterized 132 
the dynamics of the operation of a hospital during an earthquake. In comparison with the aforementioned DES 133 
models, the SD model considers both damage and recovery processes of the hospital. An indicator of hospital 134 
functionality for resilience assessment was proposed in their study. The indicator is determined by the number 135 
of patients waiting to be treated, as shown in Eq. (3) (Khanmohammadi et al. 2018): 136 
𝑄(𝑡) = {
𝐴
𝑃(𝑡)
⁡⁡⁡𝐴 ≤ 𝑃(𝑡)
⁡1⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝐴 > 𝑃(𝑡)
 (3) 
where⁡𝑄(𝑡) is hospital functionality; 𝐴 is the acceptable number of patients waiting to be treated; 𝑃(𝑡) is the 137 
number of patients waiting to be treated at time 𝑡 . The parameter 𝐴  could be determined by hospital 138 
administrators based on a set of performance criteria. The proposed approach of assessing hospital disaster 139 
resilience based on SD modeling provided an inspiring perspective to analyze the “lifecycle” of the hospital 140 
functionality during disasters. However, there were still some limitations in this research. First, utilities such as 141 
electricity, water, and gas were simply aggregated as one type of component in the SD model, named as 142 
“technical systems”, which overlooked the specific effect of each type of utilities on hospital functionality. These 143 
utilities, in reality, play critical roles in supporting hospital functionality (Achour et al. 2014, Vugrin et al. 2015). 144 
In-depth analysis of the relationships between these utilities and hospital functionality will contribute to more 145 
comprehensive identification of vulnerability of hospitals. Second, the recovery of the components was 146 
considered to only depend on monetary resources, which was too simplistic and ignored technical feasibility, 147 
causing potential bias in the calculation of recovery time and hence the overall hospital resilience. Similarly, 148 
Choi et al. (2019) built an SD model to simulate the operations of an emergency room and used the “serviceability” 149 
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of the emergency room defined by the authors to reflect its functionality. A major limitation of this model, 150 
however, is that it did not consider the damage of the hospital in terms of damages to hospital buildings and 151 
losses of medical staff. 152 
Methodology 153 
Based on the literature review, there still lacks an appropriate indicator of hospital functionality after earthquakes 154 
and an approach of analyzing both the loss and the recovery of hospital functionality after earthquakes. This 155 
paper proposes a functionality-based assessment approach of hospital resilience to earthquakes by the following 156 
three steps: 157 
1. Quantification of hospital functionality after earthquakes (i.e. 𝑄(𝑡) in Eq. (1)). A quantifiable definition of 158 
𝑄(𝑡) is needed, which should be able to reflect the desired outcome (Walden et al. 2015) that the hospital 159 
aims to achieve after earthquakes. In this paper, a new indicator of hospital functionality after earthquakes 160 
is proposed based on literature review and expert interviews. 161 
2. Modeling hospital functionality after earthquakes. Given the complexity of hospitals and their risks of being 162 
destroyed by sudden and devastating earthquakes, assessing and predicting the loss and the recovery of 163 
hospital functionality after earthquakes via physical experiments could be highly challenging (Lu and Guan 164 
2017). In this paper, SD modeling, a widely used approach for describing processes of accumulation and 165 
feedback of a complex system using differential equations (Chang et al. 2017, Wang and Yuan 2017, Leon 166 
et al. 2018), is adopted to model hospital functionality (𝑄(𝑡)) after earthquakes. Key factors that affect 167 
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𝑄(𝑡) and their interactions are identified. These factors and their interactions form the basis of the variables 168 
and equations in the SD model.  169 
3. Hospital functionality simulation and assessment of hospital resilience to earthquakes. Based on the SD 170 
model of hospital functionality, once the initial values of the variables (i.e. the inputs of the SD model) are 171 
set, 𝑄(𝑡) (i.e. the output of the SD model) can be obtained from model simulations. The inputs include two 172 
parts, including one part that describes the states of the factors affecting 𝑄(𝑡) right after the occurrence of 173 
the earthquake, and a second part that describes the variations of the factors affecting 𝑄(𝑡) over a certain 174 
time span. The former can be used to determine the loss of 𝑄(𝑡) and the latter can be used to determine the 175 
recovery of 𝑄(𝑡) . Then, after 𝑄(𝑡)  is calculated and 𝑡0  and 𝑡𝐿𝐶  are set, the hospital resilience to 176 
earthquakes can be assessed based on Eq. (1). 177 
Above provides an overview of the methodology to propose the functionality-based assessment approach 178 
of hospital resilience to earthquakes in this study. More details of the methodology will be discussed in next 179 
sections. In addition, to support the proposition of the functionality-based assessment approach of hospital 180 
resilience to earthquakes, a comprehensive review of prior studies was conducted. Moreover, expert interviews 181 
were carried out in Mianzhu, an inland Chinese city, in order to strengthen the validity of the proposed approach 182 
and gather information and data for an empirical case study. Mianzhu, located in Sichuan Province, China, was 183 
one of the worst-hit cities in the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake (also known as the Wenchuan Earthquake) that 184 
occurred on May 12, 2008, with a magnitude of 8.0 (Lu et al. 2012). Most hospitals in Mianzhu were destroyed 185 
in the earthquake and then reconstructed. The authors conducted a total of four rounds of interviews between 186 
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2017 and 2019. The qualifications of the interviewees are summarized in Table 1. 187 
1. The first round (R1) was conducted in December 2017, which aimed at constructing an indicator of 𝑄(𝑡). 188 
Four senior doctors and three senior nurses, who participated in the medical rescue in the 2008 Sichuan 189 
Earthquake, from four hospitals (one tertiary, two secondary and one primary hospitals) in Mianzhu, were 190 
interviewed. The interviewees were requested to reflect on the scenario of the medical rescue after the 191 
earthquake and provide their opinions on the definition of hospital functionality. 192 
2. The second round (R2) was conducted in March 2018. Eighteen respondents including officials from the 193 
local Health Bureau and the medical staff from five local hospitals (one tertiary, three secondary and one 194 
primary hospitals) were surveyed. They were requested to evaluate a list of factors the authors extracted 195 
from the literature that may affect 𝑄(𝑡). 196 
3. The third round (R3) was conducted in August 2018. Six medical staff from four hospitals (the same 197 
hospitals as in R1) were interviewed and requested to give opinions on the indicator of hospital functionality 198 
and the preliminary SD model of hospital functionality proposed by the authors. 199 
4. The fourth round (R4) was conducted in May 2019. Eleven medical staff from four hospitals (the same 200 
hospitals as in R1) were interviewed. They were requested to provide opinions on the modified indicator of 201 
hospital functionality and SD model after the R3 interviews. In the meanwhile, one of the hospitals was 202 
chosen for case study purpose. The medical staff in the case hospital were requested to provide additional 203 
information that was necessary to construct and run the SD model. 204 
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[Insert Table 1 here] 205 
Indicator of Hospital Functionality after Earthquakes 206 
Hospitals are aimed to provide complete medical care for the population (Gilder 1957). During emergencies, 207 
such as earthquakes, the focus of their service may be changed compared with normal conditions. Although it 208 
may not be possible to find a single indicator that can perfectly represent the full functionality of hospitals, it is 209 
feasible to find one that reflects the main functionality of hospitals during earthquakes. During emergencies, 210 
minimizing mortality and morbidity has been seen as a primary objective of hospital services (West 2001, 211 
Hendrickx et al. 2016). Hospitals are expected to accept and treat as many patients as possible so as to meet the 212 
increasing care needs in disasters (Yi et al. 2010). During the R1 interviews, the medical staff also argued that 213 
they tried every means to save lives after the earthquake in spite of tough medical working conditions. Therefore, 214 
the capability of treating patients in hospitals is the main functionality of hospitals during earthquakes, which, 215 
hence, is used as an indicator of hospital functionality after earthquakes in this study.  216 
Per Eq. (1), the system functionality should have a value range from 0 to 1. The indicator of hospital 217 
functionality, namely the capability of treating patients in hospitals, is mathematically defined as the ratio of the 218 
number of patients which a hospital is able to treat to the number of patients which the hospital is required to 219 
treat over a period, as shown in Eq. (4): 220 
𝑄(𝑡) = {
∑ 𝛽𝑖 ∙ 𝑁𝑖
𝑎(𝑡)𝑛𝑖=1
∑ 𝛽𝑖 ∙ 𝑁𝑖
𝑟(𝑡)𝑛𝑖=1
⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑁𝑖
𝑎(𝑡) ≤ 𝑁𝑖
𝑟(𝑡)⁡⁡
⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡1⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑁𝑖
𝑎(𝑡) > 𝑁𝑖
𝑟(𝑡)⁡
 (4) 
where 𝑄(𝑡) denotes hospital functionality; 𝑡 denotes time in days; 𝑁𝑖
𝑟(𝑡) denotes the number of patients with 221 
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disease 𝑖⁡that the hospital is required to treat on day 𝑡;⁡𝑁𝑖
𝑎(𝑡) denotes the number of patients with disease 𝑖⁡that 222 
the hospital is able to treat on day 𝑡; 𝛽𝑖 denotes the weight of disease 𝑖 based on its urgency; 𝑛 denotes the 223 
number of the types of diseases considered for medical care during earthquakes. 𝑁𝑖
𝑟(𝑡) can be set by the hospital 224 
or by local health authorities according to the capability of the hospital and the historical data of patient arrivals 225 
during similar disasters; 𝛽𝑖 can be set by medical experts. 226 
Factors Identification 227 
A hospital is a complex system, whose functionality is subject to the impact of a variety of factors. In this section, 228 
these factors were firstly identified from literature and then discussed in detail. Major databases and search 229 
engines including Web of Science, Google Scholar and CNKI were searched and literature including academic 230 
papers, theses and working reports was retrieved. Snowballing method, i.e. identifying literature from the 231 
references of publications, was also applied. The factors were divided into three categories based on a trio-space 232 
framework proposed by Kasai et al. (2015), namely physical, social and cyber factors. Physical factors were 233 
those owning an entity, such as medical resources, utilities, and buildings; social factors were those related to 234 
human activities, such as professional knowledge of medical staff, emergency plans, and leadership of hospital 235 
administrators; cyber factors were those related to information and data such as Hospital Information System 236 
(HIS). During the R2 interviews, after a comprehensive introduction of the goal of the interview and the 237 
meanings of the factors, the interviewees were required to give advice on adjusting the list of factors and their 238 
opinions on how much these factors affected hospital functionality. A questionnaire survey followed the 239 
interviews to quantify the effects of the factors on hospital functionality, using a 5-point Likert scale from 1 240 
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(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The average score of each factor was calculated and evaluated based 241 
on the rating scale proposed by Hansapinyo (2018). The validity of the results was enhanced by the rich field 242 
experience of the interviewees and a combination of interviews and questionnaire surveys (Khalili et al. 2015). 243 
Table 2 summarizes the finalized list of factors. These factors are further explained below.  244 
[Insert Table 2 here] 245 
Medical Resources (Medical Staff, Supplies, and Equipment) 246 
A hospital is unable to function without medical staff. Human resource management is an essential part of 247 
hospital emergency management (WHO 2011, WHO 2015). During emergencies like disasters when there will 248 
be a surge of patients, the shortage of medical staff can be a critical issue (Ukai 1996, Ochi et al. 2016). Medical 249 
supplies like medicine, disinfectant, bandages, oxygen, and beds are also essential for medical treatment in most 250 
cases. During emergencies, continuity of the hospital supply and delivery chain plays a critical role in achieving 251 
the quality of service and saving lives (WHO 2011, Sabegh et al. 2017). Medical equipment such as X-rays and 252 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) is necessary for diagnosis or treatment. Operating rooms are also regarded 253 
as a type of medical equipment in this study since they need to be well equipped in order to function. In addition, 254 
the functioning of medical equipment almost always relies on utilities such as power and water.  255 
Utilities (Power, Water, Telecommunication, and Transportation) 256 
Power probably is the most important utility, which also supports other utilities such as water and 257 
telecommunication (Beatty et al. 2006). A power failure will result in various problems in a hospital, such as 258 
unavailability of equipment, loss of lighting, malfunction of information system and so forth (Milsten 2000, 259 
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Beatty et al. 2006, Prudenzi et al. 2017). To prepare for unexpected power outages, hospitals can be equipped 260 
with generators so as to guarantee uninterrupted power supply. Water also plays an important role in hospitals, 261 
as it supports many critical services in a hospital including surgery preparation, heating, ventilation, and air-262 
conditioning (HAVC), sanitation, dialysis, sterilization and cooling some medical equipment (Milsten 2000, 263 
Roberson and Hiltebrand 2010, Welter et al. 2013, Matsumura et al. 2015). Interruptions of water supply will 264 
significantly disrupt healthcare activities (UK Department of Health 2014). Without water, hospitals would not 265 
be able to function since hygiene and sterilization cannot be guaranteed. Many hospitals store water in tanks or 266 
reserve bottled water in case of water supply disruption. However, the stored water cannot solve the special water 267 
needs such as water used in dialysis (Klein et al. 2005), which needs secondary purification by specialized 268 
devices.  269 
Telecommunication and transportation are not direct necessities in medical treatment but may affect the 270 
efficiency to deliver healthcare service. Information exchange is important in disaster rescue (Garshnek and 271 
Burkle 1999, Chen et al. 2018). Supplement of medical supplies may be delayed if the telecommunication is cut 272 
off as Mianzhu had experienced in Sichuan earthquake. Although the functioning of telecommunication systems 273 
is beyond the boundaries of hospitals, hospitals can rely on satellite phones for communication in case of 274 
disruptions of everyday telecommunication systems (Garshnek and Burkle 1999). Transportation also matters 275 
for the delivery of medical service. Damages of roads and bridges in earthquakes will badly affect the efficiency 276 
of patient transfer as well as emergency logistics (Ukai 1997, Caunhye et al. 2012). While road condition is also 277 
out of their control, hospitals are supposed to have vehicles (e.g. ambulances) to ensure successful patient transfer 278 
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on their sides. 279 
Buildings 280 
Hospital buildings always need to be available for medical activities, where the medical staff can perform the 281 
treatment and the patients can be protected. In Mianzhu, the hospital buildings were structurally damaged in the 282 
2008 Sichuan Earthquake and were hence unsafe to enter after the earthquake. The medical staff had to work 283 
outdoors, where the hygienic condition could not be guaranteed for treatment. Although they moved to tents and 284 
portable dwellings several days later, the medical staff argued that the tents and portable dwellings were all 285 
provided by the government, as the hospitals themselves were not able to prepare enough tents or portable 286 
dwellings in advance.  287 
Social and Cyber Factors 288 
Professional knowledge of disaster medical rescue is one of the basic requirements of disaster medical 289 
responders (King et al. 2019). The interviewees argued that a lack of knowledge in disaster medicine resulted in 290 
the inefficient performance of the medical staff in the face of such a sudden disaster. To improve the working 291 
performance of the medical staff during disasters, it is important to provide them with routine training (WHO 292 
2011, Zhong et al. 2015). A comprehensive emergency plan, which pre-specifies how each department of the 293 
hospital should response in emergencies, will contribute to the preparedness of hospitals to cope with disasters 294 
(WHO 2015). However, the interviewees argued that effective implementation of emergency plans was more 295 
important – “without implementation, emergency plans are just pieces of paper”. Good leadership of hospital 296 
administrators is key to ensuring the efficient operation of hospitals during emergencies (Richardson et al. 2013, 297 
 17 
 
WHO 2015). According to the interviewees, there was chaos in the operation of Mianzhu hospitals in the 298 
immediate aftermath of the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake due to an apparent lack of leadership. 299 
As for cyber factor, the HIS has been an indispensable part of modern hospitals. It supports hospital affairs 300 
and helps to increase efficiency and reduce errors of medical service (Handayani et al. 2017, Handayani et al. 301 
2018). The HIS is also subject to damages during earthquakes. According to the R2 interviewees, the HIS is not 302 
a must for treating patients since it could be replaced by labor, however, in that case, the working efficiency of 303 
medical staff would be significantly impacted. 304 
Based on the above discussions, some simplifications and hypotheses are made, as explained below, in 305 
order to quantify 𝑁𝑖
𝑎(𝑡) in Eq. (4) and ultimately to quantify 𝑄(𝑡): 306 
1. Only treatment in hospital is considered, while pre-hospital care is not. 307 
2. Once a patient receives treatment, he or she will be cured and released from the hospital. 308 
3. Medical staff, medical supplies, and medical equipment for the treatment of each disease are independent 309 
on each other, which means the staff, supplies, and equipment are disease-specific and cannot be shared 310 
across diseases. 311 
4. Power is considered to affect medical treatment in two ways, namely supporting lighting, which is 312 
considered necessary for treatment at night, and supporting medical equipment such as X-rays, MRI, and 313 
operating rooms. 314 
5. Drinking water, which does not need secondary purification, is considered necessary for all treatment. 315 
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Purified water from specialized devices, which relies on power, is only needed for some medical equipment 316 
such as Dialysis Machines. 317 
6. Telecommunication and transportation affect medical treatment indirectly, e.g. by affecting patient transfer 318 
and the supplement rate of medical supplies. 319 
7. Buildings are necessary for all treatment activities.  320 
8. Social factors affect medical treatment indirectly through other impact factors: professional knowledge 321 
affects the service capacity (the maximum number of patients who are able to be treated) of medical staff; 322 
emergency plans affect the recovery rate of physical factors; leadership of hospital administrators affects 323 
the implementation of emergency plans. 324 
9. The cyber factor, i.e. the HIS, is regarded to affect the service capacity of medical staff. 325 
Hence, 𝑁𝑖
𝑎(𝑡) can be calculated using Eq. (5) below: 326 
𝑁𝑖
𝑎(𝑡) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{[𝑆𝑡𝑖
𝑎(𝑡)]𝑚𝑖𝑛, [𝑆𝑢𝑖
𝑎(𝑡)]𝑚𝑖𝑛, [𝐸𝑖
𝑎(𝑡)]𝑚𝑖𝑛} ∙ 𝑃𝐿(𝑡) ∙ 𝑊𝐷(𝑡) ∙ 𝐵(𝑡) 
[𝑆𝑡𝑖
𝑎(𝑡)]𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝑆𝑡𝑖,1
𝑎 (𝑡),… , 𝑆𝑡𝑖,𝑜
𝑎 (𝑡),… , 𝑆𝑡𝑖,𝑛𝑆𝑡
𝑎 (𝑡)] , 𝑜 ∈ (1, 𝑛𝑆𝑡) 
[𝑆𝑢𝑖
𝑎(𝑡)]𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝑆𝑢𝑖,1
𝑎 (𝑡),… , 𝑆𝑢𝑖,𝑝
𝑎 (𝑡),… , 𝑆𝑢𝑖,𝑛𝑆𝑢
𝑎 (𝑡)] , 𝑝 ∈ (1, 𝑛𝑆𝑢) 
[𝐸𝑖
𝑎(𝑡)]𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛[𝐸𝑖,1
𝑎 (𝑡), … , 𝐸𝑖,𝑞
𝑎 (𝑡),… , 𝐸𝑖,𝑛𝐸
𝑎 (𝑡)] , 𝑞 ∈ (1, 𝑛𝐸) 
(5) 
where 𝑆𝑡𝑖,𝑜
𝑎 (𝑡), 𝑆𝑢𝑖,𝑝
𝑎 (𝑡) and 𝐸𝑖,𝑞
𝑎 (𝑡) denote the service capacity of each kind of medical staff, supplies and 327 
equipment respectively for disease 𝑖 on day 𝑡; 𝑛𝑆𝑡, 𝑛𝑆𝑢, and 𝑛𝐸 denote the number of kinds of medical staff, 328 
supplies and equipment respectively; 𝑃𝐿(𝑡) denotes the power supply for lighting (given that lighting power is 329 
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only necessary for the treatment in the night time, 𝑃𝐿(𝑡) = 1 when power is available for lighting and 𝑃𝐿(𝑡) =330 
0.7 when power is not available for lighting); 𝑊𝐷(𝑡) denotes the drinking water supply (binary, 1 when drinking 331 
water is available, while 0 when unavailable); and 𝐵(𝑡) denotes the availability of hospital buildings, equaling 332 
to the percentage of residual capacity of the buildings after earthquakes. 333 
SD Modeling 334 
Once the value variations over time of the factors in Eq. (5) are obtained, 𝑄(𝑡) can be obtained using Eq. (4) 335 
and Eq. (5). However, as aforementioned, some of these factors are interacted and their values are correlated in 336 
complicated, non-linear relationships. Therefore, the value variations of the factors are essentially a type of 337 
emergent property that cannot be predicted only by examining individual factors. The relationships of the factors 338 
play a fundamental role in determining the factors’ values and therefore must also be considered. In order to 339 
model these dynamics and interactions of the factors, from which important inputs for calculating 𝑄(𝑡) can be 340 
obtained, an SD model of hospital functionality after earthquakes (SD-HFE) is proposed in this study. In the 341 
process of model development, the SD-HFE was revised and finalized by experts through two rounds of 342 
interviews (R3 and R4).  343 
The structure of the SD-HFE is split into multiple parts shown in different figures for readability, among 344 
which Fig. 2 illustrates the high-level causal loops of the model (i.e. the overall structure of the model), while 345 
Figs. 3-9 further illustrate the detailed causal loops of the factors (i.e. parts of the model) included in Fig. 2. 346 
Variables in all figures follow the same naming convention, and the variables that appear in multiple figures are 347 
the proxies through which different parts of the model interact. Disease A is used as an example in these figures 348 
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for brevity. The overall structure of the SD-HFE is developed based on the following logic: after an earthquake 349 
happens, patients arrive at hospitals and are first triaged by disease type. Patients with different types of disease 350 
are treated separately.  Those who have received treatment are cured and released from the hospital. Some 351 
patients waiting to be treated are transferred to other healthcare facilities by ambulance and some patients, who 352 
die during the waiting, are sent to morgues (Cimellaro et al. 2017). In the SD-HFE, two types of medical supplies 353 
are considered, namely medical consumables and beds. Medical consumables, such as medicine, bandages, and 354 
oxygen, can be consumed and supplemented, while beds are reusable medical supplies. According to Eq. (5), 355 
treatment of patients relies on “Service capacity of medical staff”, “Service capacity of medical consumables”, 356 
“Number of available beds”, “Service capacity of medical equipment”, “Power supply for lighting”, “Drinking 357 
water supply”, and “Availability of building”.  358 
[Insert Fig. 2 here] 359 
Figs. 3-6 illustrate the dynamics of different medical resources, including medical staff, medical 360 
consumables, beds, and medical equipment, respectively. Specifically, “Service capacity of medical staff” 361 
depends on both “Number of medical staff” and “Full service capacity per medical staff”. “Service capacity of 362 
medical staff” is also affected by “Availability of HIS” and staff’s “Knowledge of disaster medicine” (see Fig. 363 
3). “Number of medical staff” may decrease due to the staff’s deaths and injuries caused by the earthquake. 364 
Medical consumables are consumed while patients are being treated. They can be supplemented, and the 365 
supplement rate is affected by “Road state”, “Availability of communication”, and “Emergency plan effect” (see 366 
Fig. 4). In Fig. 5, the dynamics of beds mainly depend on “Hospitalization rate” and “Discharge rate” of the 367 
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patients who receive treatment. Beds can also be supplemented if they are not adequate.  In addition, medical 368 
equipment (Fig. 6) may suffer damage during earthquakes and lose availability. “Service capacity of medical 369 
equipment” is also affected by “Medical water supply” and “Power supply”, which support the operation of 370 
medical equipment, and also affected by “Rate of equipment usage” and “Full service capacity of medical 371 
equipment”. 372 
[Insert Fig. 3 here] 373 
[Insert Fig. 4 here] 374 
[Insert Fig. 5 here] 375 
[Insert Fig. 6 here] 376 
With regard to utilities, two parts are considered, including the municipal part (Fig. 7), which is beyond the 377 
boundaries of hospitals, and the hospital part (Fig. 8), which is within the boundaries of hospitals. The municipal 378 
part includes roads, telecommunication, municipal power, and municipal water; the hospital part includes 379 
ambulances, satellite telephones, power generators, fuel, and stored water. Each type of municipal part of utilities 380 
has a “state” to describe its availability, which then determines its serviceability. The utilities’ states may be 381 
worsened and their availability may be lost after the earthquake hit, while the states can also be improved after 382 
recovery measures are taken. For municipal water and telecommunication, their availability also relies on the 383 
availability of municipal power supply (Fig. 7). As aforementioned, the supply of power and water in the hospital 384 
mainly depends on the municipal supply, while the hospital can also prepare power generation instruments and 385 
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store water in case of accidents (Fig. 8). “Generator power supply” relies on both “Generators” and “Fuel 386 
storage”, which can be consumed and supplemented. In addition, electric power generation also requires water 387 
for cooling (Vugrin et al. 2015). The stored water, as another source of “Drinking water supply” in the hospital, 388 
can also be consumed and supplemented by hospital. “Medical water supply” relies on both “Drinking water 389 
supply” and “Power supply” as power is needed to run the purification equipment. 390 
[Insert Fig. 7 here] 391 
[Insert Fig. 8 here] 392 
Fig. 9 shows the dynamics of the hospital buildings, social factors and cyber factors. The state of buildings 393 
determines their availability, which can be recovered by repair or reconstruction. “Availability of HIS” depends 394 
on “Power supply”. The HIS is also equipped with UPS. “Recovery rate of HIS” is considered to depend on 395 
“Recovery rate of building” where it is installed. For social factors, medical staff’s “Knowledge of disaster 396 
medicine” can be improved by “Training”, and “Emergency plan effect”, which can affect the recovery rate of 397 
some physical factors as aforementioned, is related to “Comprehensiveness of emergency plans” and 398 
“Leadership” of hospital administrators.  399 
[Insert Fig. 9 here] 400 
The relationships among different factors can be classified in two types: one is one-way relationships, 401 
namely one factor is affected by another; the other one is interactions, namely two factors are affected by each 402 
other. For one-way relationships, one example is that transportation condition affects the supplement of medical 403 
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consumables, which is modeled by the relationship between “Road state” (Fig. 7) and “Supplement rate of 404 
medical consumables” (Fig. 4); another example is that “Emergency plan effect”(Fig. 9) affects the recovery 405 
rates of some physical factors such as medical staff (Fig. 3), medical consumables (Fig. 4), medical beds (Fig. 406 
5), medical equipment (Fig. 6), fuel and stored water (Fig. 8), as the recovery processes of the factors are usually 407 
pre-specified in emergency plans of hospitals. As for interactions, one example is that two types of utilities, 408 
namely power and water, are interacted, where “Municipal power supply”, as one source of “Power supply”, 409 
affects “Municipal water supply” and further affects “Drinking water supply” (Fig. 7), while conversely 410 
“Drinking water supply” affects “Generator power supply” (Fig. 8), which is another source of “Power supply”. 411 
Some factors and the treatment activity are also interacted. For instance, “Service capacity of medical 412 
consumables” (Fig. 4) and “Number of available beds” (Fig. 5) contribute to “Treatment rate” of patients (Figs. 413 
4-5), which in turn determines “Consumption rate of medical consumables” (Fig. 4) and “Beds occupying rate” 414 
(Fig. 5).  415 
Simulation of the SD-HFE and Assessment of Hospital Resilience to Earthquakes 416 
Inputs are needed to run the SD-HFE. As aforementioned, the inputs include the ones describing the states of the 417 
factors right after the occurrence of the earthquake, which depend on potential loss or damage of the factors, and 418 
the ones describing the variations of the factors over time. Potential methods to determine the inputs are given 419 
in this section. FEMA (2012a) proposes the FEMA-P58 methodology for seismic performance assessment of 420 
buildings as well as an electronic calculation tool called “PACT” for implementing the methodology. By 421 
inputting the data on building information (story height, area etc.), occupancy, component fragilities, the 422 
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earthquake scenario and so forth, the PACT is able to perform loss calculations including repair cost, downtime, 423 
and casualty estimates (FEMA 2012b). Hence, the casualties of medical staff and the loss of the hospital 424 
buildings can be obtained using the PACT. The PACT can also potentially be used to determine the loss of the 425 
components located in the hospital building such as medical supplies, medical equipment, hospital part of 426 
utilities, and the HIS once their fragility data are obtained. With regard to the recovery of the above factors, the 427 
supplement of medical staff, medical supplies, fuel for generators, and drinking water, and recovery of medical 428 
equipment can be estimated according to the interviews with the hospital staff. The time needed for retrofitting 429 
the hospital building can be obtained using the PACT. In addition, the loss and recovery rates of municipal part 430 
of utilities can be estimated using Hazus - MH 2.1, which is also developed by FEMA (2018), if required data 431 
are made available. For social factors, the variables in the model can be set according to experts’ opinions 432 
collected in interviews. The profile data of the hospital, such as the initial number of medical staff, initial service 433 
capacity of medical supplies and so on, can be obtained through surveys. For the inputs which require medical 434 
knowledge and historical experience, such as patient arrivals, death rates, hospitalization rates, and discharge 435 
rates and so on, can be estimated by experts.  436 
When the simulation is performed using the SD-HFE, the variables in the model vary over time. 𝑁𝑖
𝑎(𝑡) 437 
can be obtained based on Eq. (5) and then 𝑄(𝑡) can be calculated based on Eq. (4). Setting 𝑡0 as the time when 438 
the earthquake occurs and 𝑡𝐿𝐶 as a time window of interest, the resilience level of the hospital to earthquakes 439 
can be obtained based on Eq. (1). 440 
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Case Study 441 
A case study was carried out using the proposed approach to quantify the resilience of a tertiary hospital in 442 
Mianzhu. The hospital, located in the city center, had 686 beds with annual patient arrivals of around 0.70 million. 443 
The hospital building, reconstructed after the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake, had 12 floors. The pharmacy was located 444 
on the first floor and the operating rooms were located on the fourth floor. The simulation scenario assumed that 445 
the reconstructed hospital suffered an earthquake similar to the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake at the present time. All 446 
data that were needed as inputs of the SD-HFE were obtained in the R4 interviews. The ground motion data of 447 
the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake with a peak ground acceleration of 6.33 m/s2 was used in this case study. 448 
Residual “Number of medical staff” was set by taking into consideration the casualty of the medical staff 449 
estimated using the FEMA PACT. It was assumed that all the medical staff were working in the hospital when 450 
the earthquake occurred and hence there was no supplement of medical staff. Due to a lack of the fragility data 451 
which were necessary for damage analysis in the FEMA PACT, the loss of medical supplies and damage of 452 
medical equipment and the HIS was estimated based on the damage state of the hospital building, and it was 453 
assumed that there was no damage of hospital part of utilities. Using the method proposed by Xiong et al. (2016), 454 
the damage state (none, slight, moderate, extensive or complete) of each floor of the hospitals under the ground 455 
motion was obtained. Then, the loss or availability of the above components was estimated according to the 456 
damage state of the targeted floor using a lookup table (Table 3) developed by the authors in this study. For loss 457 
or availability estimation of medical consumables, beds, operating rooms, and the HIS, the targeted floor in Table 458 
3 referred to the floor where the pharmacies, wards, operating rooms, and HIS were located respectively. The 459 
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availability of the building equaled to the ratio of residual availability of floors. “Supplementary rate of medical 460 
consumables” was estimated based on data collected in the R4 interviews, which were adjusted by the “Road 461 
state”, “Availability of communication” and “Emergency plan effect”; the recovery rates of hospital part of 462 
utilities were assumed or estimated by the interviewees; “Recovery rate of building” was set based on the repair 463 
time of the building estimated using the FEMA PACT, and the repair process was assumed to be linear; the 464 
operating rooms and the HIS were considered fully recovered when the hospital building was fully recovered. 465 
Since data required by Hazus - MH 2.1 for analyzing the damage and recovery of municipal part of utilities 466 
were not available, the damage and recovery rates were set as the actual rates that were observed in the 2008 467 
Sichuan Earthquake and reported in the interviews. This may lead to somewhat conservative assessment results 468 
because after the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake, there was a huge investment on the overall capability of the Mianzhu 469 
to cope with earthquake, therefore, the current municipal part of utilities should be more resilient to earthquakes 470 
than they were in 2008. There were four typical kinds of diseases considered in the case study: disease A (minor 471 
trauma like abrasion), disease B (severe trauma like fractures and brain injuries), disease C (upper respiratory 472 
infection and enteritis) and disease D (other diseases) (Liu et al. 2008). The weights of these four types of 473 
diseases (𝛽𝑖 in Eq.(4)) were set by the average death rate of each type of disease. Operations were only necessary 474 
for all patients with disease B and 10% of the patients with disease D, according to the interviews. Patient arrivals 475 
with different diseases after the earthquake were set after scaling the data from the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake 476 
according to annual patient arrivals. 𝑁𝑖
𝑟(𝑡) of each hospital was set according to the daily service capacity of 477 
the current medical resources. Gaussian noise was introduced to reflect the fluctuations of the service capacity 478 
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of the medical resources. Table S1 summarized the main inputs for the calculation of hospital functionality in 479 
the case study, and Table S2 provided the system dynamics equations used in the case study. The SD-HFE was 480 
run in Anylogic 8.4.0 PLE. The results are reported in the next section. 481 
[Insert Table 3 here] 482 
Results 483 
Fig. 10 illustrates the functionality curve of the case hospital in Mianzhu. The curve reflects a pattern of “first 484 
decreasing and then recovering”. Immediately after the occurrence of the earthquake (Day 0), 𝑄(𝑡) dropped to 485 
0.65, which was mainly due to the loss of serviceability of the hospital building. In the meantime, there was 486 
municipal power failure caused by the earthquake. Although the hospital was equipped with power generators, 487 
the stored diesel fuel was only enough for one-day use. Hence, 𝑄(𝑡) fell to 0.26 at the end of Day 1. 𝑄(𝑡) 488 
bounced back when the municipal power was restored on Day 2. Then, 𝑄(𝑡) began to increase gradually as 489 
measures were being taken to repair the hospital building. Since Day 19 when the hospital building was fully 490 
recovered, 𝑄(𝑡) had generally remained stable at 1.00 with slight fluctuations caused by the Gaussian noise 491 
introduced to the SD-HFE. Setting 𝑡0 as the day when the earthquake happened and 𝑡𝐿𝐶 as 60 days when the 492 
distribution of the diseases after the earthquake tended to be stable (Liu et al. 2008), the resilience level of the 493 
hospital using the SD-HFE was calculated as 0.91 based on Eq. (1). 494 
[Insert Fig. 10 here] 495 
In order to further explore the reasons behind the variations of the functionality curves, the performance 496 
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(𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑡)) of the hospital was assessed per each kind of disease, in other words, 𝑁𝑖
𝑎(𝑡)/𝑁𝑖
𝑟(𝑡) was calculated for 497 
each value of variable 𝑖. The results are depicted in Fig. 11. As can be seen in the figure, after the earthquake 498 
occurred (Day 0), 𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑡) for Disease A, B, C, and D fell to 0.68, 0.80, 0.90, and 0.41 respectively. The 499 
differences in the performance were due to the different initial service capacity of the medical resources. On Day 500 
1 when there was no lighting due to power outage after the generators ran out of fuel, the performance of the 501 
hospital for all diseases significantly dropped. Among the performance, 𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑡) for Disease B fell to 0 and 502 
𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑡) for Disease D fell to 0.29, as the operating rooms were not available due to the power failure. On Day 503 
2, 𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑡) for all diseases bounced back when the municipal power was restored, which was consistent with the 504 
trend of 𝑄(𝑡) in Fig. 10. On Day 4, a decrease of 𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑡) for Disease B was observed. It was due to the 505 
deficiency of medical consumables, which only lasted for one day as more medical consumables were 506 
supplemented. From Day 4, there was a significant drop in 𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑡) for Disease C, when the hospital received an 507 
increasing number of patients and ran out beds. However, as the occupied beds were gradually released and the 508 
building was being restored, 𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑡) for Disease C went back up over time. Nevertheless, the decrease of 𝑄(𝑡) 509 
from Day 4 was not very obvious because 𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑡) for Disease A and D kept increasing with the recovery of the 510 
building from Day 2 when the municipal power was recovered, which neutralized the effects of the decrease of 511 
𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑡) for Disease B and C. As shown in Fig. 11,⁡𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑡) for Disease B got fully recovered on Day 13 rather 512 
than on Day 19 when the building was fully recovered. It was due to that the storage of medical resources for 513 
Disease B was higher than it was actually needed so that 𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑡) for Disease B could be at a relatively high level 514 
and be recovered earlier in spite of the impact of the damaged building. In addition, 𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑡) for Disease D was 515 
generally the lowest among all four curves, because it was mainly restricted by the service capacity of medical 516 
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staff, which fell 50% due to the unavailability of the HIS. However, on Day 19 when the HIS was recovered and 517 
so was the service capacity of medical staff, 𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑡) for Disease D bounced by to around 1.00, which contributed 518 
to the full recovery of 𝑄(𝑡) on the same day. 519 
[Insert Fig. 11 here] 520 
The results of the case study were provided for three experts in Mianzhu who had participated in the 521 
aforementioned interviews, including one associate chief physician and one senior nurse from the case hospital 522 
and one administration staff from the local Heath Bureau. The experts all commented that the results were in 523 
line with their expectations and could well reflect the characteristics of the behavior of the hospital after 524 
earthquakes. 525 
Discussions 526 
Extreme Condition Test 527 
In order to ensure that the SD-HFE was structurally valid, extreme condition tests were conducted. The inputs 528 
of the variables in the model were set to zero or infinite (values large enough, around ten thousand times larger 529 
than other variables) individually, which examined the behavior of the model under various extreme conditions. 530 
The results of the extreme conditions tests showed that the SD-HFE behaved as expected. In this section, two 531 
tests were given as examples. One condition (Condition 1) was to assume that the roads around the hospital were 532 
totally impassable and “Recovery rate of roads” was zero with other conditions unchanged compared with the 533 
case study. Under such condition, the hospital had no access to supplement of medical supplies and could not 534 
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transfer patients to other locations (patient arrivals were considered unaffected by “Road state”). Another 535 
condition (Condition 2) was to assume that “Recovery rate of municipal power” was zero, which indicated that 536 
the municipal power would be continuously unavailable due to the damage caused by the earthquake. The results 537 
of the case study served as a reference (marked as Condition 0). Fig. 12 illustrates the results of the two tests. 538 
Under Condition 1, for the first two days, 𝑄(𝑡) was not impacted compared to Condition 0 due to the initial 539 
storage of medical consumables. However, when the hospital was running out of the medical consumables, 𝑄(𝑡) 540 
began to decrease. The first decreases occurred on Day 4 and Day 5 when medical consumables for Disease B 541 
was running out; the second decreases occurred on Day 6 and Day 7 when medical consumables for Disease C 542 
was running out; the third decreases occurred on Day 20 and Day 21 when medical consumables for Disease D 543 
was running out. After then, 𝑄(𝑡) kept decreasing as medical consumables for Disease A were consumed. Under 544 
Condition 2, unlike Condition 0, 𝑄(𝑡) did not bounce back on Day 2, because the municipal power was not 545 
recovered. As power affected 𝑄(𝑡) through access to lighting and medical equipment, the hospital was able to 546 
maintain a low level of functionality. It was because that the treatment activities, which did not rely on medical 547 
equipment and happened in the daytime, were not affected. However, municipal power supply was also essential 548 
to municipal water supply, which in turn determined whether the hospital could have access to drinking water 549 
that was critical to 𝑄(𝑡). Thus, from the curve in Condition 2, it could be seen that 𝑄(𝑡) was kept at a level of 550 
around 0.25 due to the storage of drinking water until Day 7, when the stored drinking water ran out and 𝑄(𝑡) 551 
fell to zero. This curve of 𝑄(𝑡) also reflected the interactions among utilities.  552 
[Insert Fig. 12 here] 553 
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Adaptation of the Hospital 554 
During the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake, the case hospital was severely damaged. The power and water supply was 555 
cut off for days and almost all the functional departments were unavailable. The medical staff the authors talked 556 
to during the R4 interviews were asked to recall and estimate 𝑄(𝑡) of the case hospital after the occurrence of 557 
the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake. In order to facilitate their understanding of 𝑄(𝑡), it was simplified as “the 558 
percentage of patients the hospital was able to treat”. It should be noted that such a simplification ignored the 559 
weights of diseases, i.e. 𝛽𝑖 in Eq. (4). According to the interviewees, the patients they were not able to treat then 560 
were usually those with life-threatening diseases. The weights of these diseases were supposed to be high because 561 
𝛽𝑖  was set based on the death rate of the disease in the case study. Hence, the estimated 𝑄(𝑡) would be 562 
overestimated. The interviewees indicated that 𝑄(𝑡) showed three obvious stages, including treatment on site, 563 
treatment in tents and treatment in portable dwellings, where 𝑄(𝑡) was about 0.40, 0.60 and 0.90 respectively 564 
as shown in Fig. 13. Around two years later when the current hospital was reconstructed and put into use, 𝑄(𝑡) 565 
recovered to 1.00 (not shown in Fig. 13). Setting 𝑡0 as the day when the earthquake happened and 𝑡𝐿𝐶 as 60 566 
days, the resilience level of the hospital to the 2008 Sichuan Earthquake was calculated as 0.61 based on Eq. (1).  567 
[Insert Fig. 13 here] 568 
In Fig. 13, both curves had significant decreases in the first few days after the earthquake occurred. It was 569 
because that the decreases were mainly caused by the failure of utilities like power and water and the inputs of 570 
the damage and recovery rate of municipal utilities in the case study were set to be the same as in the year 2008. 571 
Nevertheless, the decrease of 𝑄(𝑡) in the case study had a one-day lag due to the implementation of power 572 
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generators in the hospital. Moreover, the current hospital building suffered much less damage in the case study 573 
than the year 2008, contributing to fewer casualties of medical staff and less loss or damage of medical supplies 574 
and equipment, which in turn contributed to a less loss of 𝑄(𝑡) and a higher resilience level. Such results echoed 575 
the feedback collected during the R4 interviews. The medical staff in the hospital suggested that they had been 576 
much more prepared to cope with earthquakes than before – with a more robust building and more stored supplies. 577 
They were quite sure that the hospital could perform much better if the same earthquake in 2008 happened again. 578 
According to Eq. (4), 𝑄(𝑡) depends on not only 𝑁𝑖
𝑎(𝑡) but also 𝑁𝑖
𝑟(𝑡). 𝑁𝑖
𝑟(𝑡) reflects the expected 579 
serviceability of the hospital which is related to the resources it has. Obviously, a tertiary hospital is usually 580 
required to serve more people and handle more types of diseases than a primary hospital. From the year 2008 to 581 
the present time, the case hospital has become a tertiary hospital with an annual patient arrival of around 0.70 582 
million from a secondary hospital with an annual patient arrival of around ten thousand. The current 𝑁𝑖
𝑟(𝑡) is 583 
much higher than that in 2008. Therefore, the resilience level of the hospital increases by 49% from 0.61 to 0.91 584 
since the year 2008, while the number of patients the hospital is able to treat has increased by an even much 585 
larger percentage.  586 
Policy Sensitivity Test 587 
In the case study, the decreases of 𝑄(𝑡) mainly due to three issues, namely power failure, deficiency of beds 588 
and the loss of serviceability of the hospital building. In this section, the authors tested the effectiveness of three 589 
policies that were supposed to address the above issues using the SD-HFE. Herein, the policies are: Policy 1 - 590 
the hospital reserves twice as much fuel as it does now; Policy 2 - the hospital shifts 40 beds from the departments 591 
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for Disease C to the departments for Disease D after the earthquake; Policy 3 - the hospital shortens the recovery 592 
time of the building from 19 days to 10 days by hiring more workers. The inputs of the model were adjusted 593 
according to each policy. The effects of the three policies based on simulation results were illustrated in Fig. 14, 594 
where the result of the case study was also shown marked as Policy 0. 595 
[Insert Fig. 14 here] 596 
Fig. 14 showed the effectiveness of the policies, which overall improved 𝑄(𝑡). Policy 1’s effectiveness 597 
indicated that a higher storage of fuel did work to avoid the abrupt loss of 𝑄(𝑡) caused by municipal power 598 
failure. However, a new drop in 𝑄(𝑡) occurred on Day 3. By backtracking the variables in the SD-HFE, it was 599 
found that medical consumables for Disease B happened to be deficient on Day 3 because they were consumed 600 
faster when the power was uninterrupted from the beginning. Such deficiency caused the drop. Hence, Policy 1 601 
should be accompanied by another policy of enhancing the storage of medical consumables for Disease B so as 602 
to better improve 𝑄(𝑡). Policy 2’s effectiveness indicated that proper distribution of medical supplies in different 603 
departments of the hospital were also important to enhance the hospital resilience to earthquakes. However, such 604 
a “distribution” is disease-specific and the distribution for earthquakes might not work for other types of disasters 605 
once the distribution of the diseases caused by the disaster was different. Policy 3’s effectiveness indicated that 606 
a higher recovery rate of hospital building would contribute to a higher recovery rate of⁡𝑄(𝑡), which was as 607 
expected. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the purpose of the policy test was to demonstrate the feasibility 608 
of using the SD-HFE to assess the effectiveness of possible resilience enhancement policies rather than develop 609 
feasible or optimal resilience enhancement policies. Hence, some factors such as structural repair and 610 
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reconstruction activities that may potentially cause interruptions to medical operations, were not considered in 611 
the policy test. Overall, 𝑄(𝑡) calculated using the SD-HFE was sensitive to the proposed policies and the 612 
evolution of 𝑄(𝑡) under the three polices headed for the same trend, which proved the reliability of the SD-HFE 613 
(Jiang et al. 2015). 614 
Conclusions 615 
This research proposes a new functionality-based assessment approach of quantifying hospital resilience to 616 
earthquakes. A new indicator of hospital functionality is proposed and the SD-HFE is developed to simulate and 617 
compute the hospital functionality after earthquakes, which considers both the damages and the recovery 618 
processes of the hospital. The validity of the approach is tested using a case study of a hospital in China. The 619 
proposed approach can contribute to analyzing the evolution of hospital functionality after an earthquake and 620 
assess hospital earthquake resilience. Moreover, the approach can serve as a tool for the decision makers of the 621 
hospitals to identify the weakness in hospital earthquake resilience and compare the effectiveness of different 622 
resilience enhancement measures so as to propose targeted solutions. 623 
While the proposed approach provides a promising tool to enable the assessment of hospital resilience to 624 
earthquakes, there are several limitations in this study that should be acknowledged. A few assumptions were 625 
made for the proposed assessment approach. Some of those assumptions, however, may be strict. For instance, 626 
medical resources (medical staff, medical supplies, and medical equipment) for the treatment of each disease are 627 
considered independent on each other. In fact, different diseases may require common medical resources and 628 
hospitals themselves may arrange their medical resources flexibly so as to maximize their functionalities in 629 
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emergencies. Future research should look into the correlation of the medical resources needed in the treatment 630 
for different diseases, which may require more domain knowledge in medicine and pharmacy. Moreover, there 631 
could be other potential factors that may affect hospital functionality after earthquakes, in addition to the ones 632 
identified in the SD-HFE. These factors could be identified and examined in future research for further 633 
improvement of the SD-HFE. For a practical assessment of hospital resilience, it is also suggested to consider 634 
the uncertainties of the occurrences, as well as the intensities of earthquakes. In addition, while the feasibility of 635 
using the proposed approach to compare the effectiveness of possible resilience enhancement policies has been 636 
demonstrated, how to develop or optimize these policies, which should consider their costs, feasibility, and 637 
interactions, is worth further investigation in future research. 638 
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Table 1. Qualifications of the interviewees 
Items Categories  Number of interviewees 
  R1 R2 R3 R4 
Current titles Associate chief physician 3  5 4 3 
Attending doctor 1 3 1 3 
Practitioner 0  3 1 2 
Senior nurse 3 2 0 3 
Nurses 0 1 0 0 
 Administration staff 0 4 0 0 
Years of professional 
experience 
≥30 years 1 1 1 4 
20-29 years 5 11 4 5 
10-19 years 1 3 1 4 
≤9 years 0 3 0 0 
Education Bachelor or above 5 11 4 7 
Other 2 7 2 4 
Worked  during 
earthquakes? 
Yes 7 15 6 11 
No 0 3  0 0 
Total  7 18 6 11 
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Table 2. Factors identified to be influential to hospital functionality after earthquakes 
No. Factors Categories Resultsa 
F1 Sufficient medical staff Physical Strongly agree 
F2 Sufficient medical supplies  Physical Strongly agree 
F3 Available medical equipment Physical Strongly agree 
F4 Available electricity supply  Physical Strongly agree 
F5 Available water supply Physical Strongly agree 
F6 Available telecommunication Physical Strongly agree 
F7 Available transportation for patient transfer Physical Strongly agree 
F8 Safe buildings Physical Strongly agree 
F9 Sufficient professional knowledge Social Strongly agree 
F10 Comprehensive emergency plans Social Strongly agree 
F11 Good leadership of hospital administrators Social Strongly agree 
F12 Functional Hospital Information System (HIS) Cyber Strongly agree 
a“Strongly agree” means the average score of the factor falls within [4.21, 5.00] (Hansapinyo 
2018). 
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Table 3. Lookup table for the inputs for the SD-HFE in the case study 
Model input 
Damage state of the targeted floor  
None Slight Moderate Extensive Complete 
Loss of medical consumables 0 5% 10% 50% 90% 
Loss of beds 0 0 20% 60% 100% 
Availability of operating rooms 100% 100% 0 0 0 
HIS state 100% 0 0 0 0 
Availability of floor 100% 80% 0 0 0 
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